11 Kant, Perpetual Peace, at 105. 12 In this famous passage, Kant writes that "the people of the world have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.
The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity." See Kant, Perpetual Peace, at 107-108. 13 For an argument about the existence of an "internal connection" between domestic and cosmopolitan jurisprudence, see also Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 315 (2009) ("any conception of national constitutionalism that takes as basic the idea of free and equals governing themselves is internally connected to a cosmopolitan paradigm of constitutionalism. It is ultimately not possible to make sense of the idea of constitutional self-government of free and equals within the statist paradigm.") 14 See also James Bohman, The Public Spheres of the World Citizen, in James Bohman and Matthias LutzBachmann, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal 188-193 (MIT Press, 1997 ) (discussing institutional responsiveness as a precondition for the creation of a cosmopolitan public sphere). For a discussion of cosmopolitanism and the state, see Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State (Princeton, 1970) . 15 Placing the debate about foreign law in this broader perspective vindicates Fred Schauer's view concerning the debate about the authority of foreign law teaches at least as much about what law is as it does about how law They expand the pool of normative references and add renewed pressure for justification and reflectiveness within the constitutional system.
It might help at this early stage to give a preliminary and schematic statement of my claims:
1. The legitimacy of a political order is a function of that order's responsiveness to the claims of citizens to institutional recognition and/or action (or inaction); judgments of legitimacy are, in part, judgments about normative responsiveness. In a democracy, citizens are reasonable sovereigns and "the source of valid claims" 16 on state institutions. 17 2. Distortion effects occur when citizens formulate their claims and when institutions translate and process them; these effects threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the political order.
Citizens translate their claims into the language of the institution on which, by right, they are entitled to press claims. Institutional responsiveness to a citizen's claim to recognition and/or action is a statement about that citizen's social standing. As Joel Feinberg wrote, "what is called 'human dignity' may be simply the recognizable capacity to assert claims." 18 operates. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931 (2008) . The conception of law that eventually derives from my argument aims to downplay neither the role of history, nor that of politics or morality.
Harold Bermann labeled such an approach "integrative jurisprudence." See Harold J. Berman, Toward An
Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality , History, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 779 (1988) 16 John Rawls, Political Liberalism 32 (1996 ed.) (hereinafter "PL" in the body of the text) (arguing that in a constitutional democracy citizens "regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.") 17 I do not mean that only citizens can the source of valid claims. Throughout this article, references to the claims of "citizens" should not be read to imply that political institutions have lesser duties towards resident non-citizens, or no duties whatsoever towards non-citizens. That is not the question of this paper, though it is no doubt an essential question for any comprehensive study of cosmopolitanism. I thank Dan Kanstroom for pressing me to clarify this important point. 18 See I state below these claims in a more narrative fashion that reflects how the argument will unfold. To start, I do not travel this road alone. My companion is Rawls' Political Liberalism, which I engage in order to establish a connection between, on the one hand, legitimacy conditions for political ordering in a free community of equals and, on the other hand, the capacity of that order's constitutional system to internalize in its procedures and discourse the 19 Charles Black, A New Birth of Freedom 159 (Yale, 1997) (referring to "judicial glaciality").
need for self-correction through heuristic appropriation of experiences of other constitutional democracies.
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I start by building on Rawls' argument about the challenge that deep, reasonable and irreconcilable disagreement in society poses to the basic terms of citizens' interaction with one another and with public institutions, and ultimately on their experience of self-government.
Citizens can neither establish nor retain a connectedness with the political world if their claims fail to engage the institutions to which they are addressed. 21 Institutions thus have a duty to respond to the claims of a pluralist citizenry in ways that recognize and reinforce the social standing of each citizen claimant as free and equal. "Respond" is, in this context, a euphemism.
At issue here are exercises of political power that coerce free and equal citizens into compliance with norms which they can -and often do -reasonably contest on substantive, fairness grounds.
Liberal constitutionalism offers an answer to the question when such coercion is legitimate and establishes the duties that shape exchanges in the public space. I identify the duty of civility and the foundations of political responsibility as the grounds for a responsive posture of institutions.
This posture is one of normative availability towards citizens. 22 It demands not just any response, 20 In keeping with Rawls! this approach emphasizes the centrality of institutions. For a critique of the institutional frame! see Amartya Sen! The Idea of Justice (Harvard! 2010) . 21 Regarding social unity, the aim is to understand the in-between social space of reason-giving. As Hannah Arendt wrote, "(w)henever people come together, the world thrusts itself between them, and it is in this in-between space that all human affairs are conducted." Hannah Arendt, Introduction into Politics in The Promise of Politics 106 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005) . 22 My argument centers on citizens' claims from the perspective of "liberal normative individualism." See C. Edwin
Baker, Michelman on Constitutional Democracy, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 511, 511 (2004) . It is of course possible to make related claims from other perspectives. For instance, Jack Balkin has gestured in the direction of responsiveness in the formation of legitimacy judgments in his discussion of the role of social feedback on legitimacy via mechanisms such as political parties or social movements. Balkin surmises that there must be "some kind of feedback mechanism that makes the dimension of constitutional change responsive to popular opinion about the Constitution. If such a feedback mechanism is missing, there is no guarantee that the constitution that was respect-worthy at one time will not lose that legitimacy." See Jack Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 485, 503 (2004 and emphasizing the dialectical relationship between constitutional culture and constitutional law). 23 However liberating a reliance on acceptability as rational hypothetical acceptance of the system of government has been to contemporary theories of political legitimacy, especially of the post-metaphysical kind, this approach has led many contemporary thinkers, Rawls included, to imply but rarely dwell on the theoretical implications of citizens' proactive stance in having an impact on their political world. By contrast, emphasizing the fair value of mechanisms that enhance the responsiveness of constitutional systems helps to articulate the citizenry's proactive stance in a dynamic conception of legitimacy.
political communities, for instance in the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation, is part of the strategy for self-correction. 24 When constitutional claims are understood as citizens' own interpretations of constitutional provisions that aspire to official status upon endorsement from courts as the institutions invested with the authority to interpret authoritatively the meaning of the constitutional text, then the heuristic appropriation of foreign constitutional practices enhances, rather than undermines, the democratic experience of a particular community to the extent it helps institutions to do justice to the claim presented by their own free and equal citizens. 25 Much can, and has been said in contemporary scholarship, about the mechanics of openness. 26 What remains missing is an argument about the normative foundations of these mechanisms. I argue that the authority of foreign law in constitutional interpretation is grounded in the liberal constitutionalist commitment to freedom and equality.
Before I begin, let me add a few words about my approaching the task at hand in dialogue with John Rawls. 27 I turn to Rawls for a few reasons. First, the centrality of the constitution in his conception of legitimacy is helpful in the effort to establish the constitutional relevance of a 24 It is only one of myriad such mechanisms. In the last section, I mention other examples, including the proportionality method of constitutional analysis, the publication of separate opinions, judicial review itself etc. 25 The distinction between top-down and bottom-up constitutional interpretation maps, with some approximation, 67-83 (2006) . 27 Read as Rawlsian exegesis, my analysis expands his conception in a direction he did not explore directly.
Specifically, the analysis draws on Political Liberalism to build theoretical pillars that support the openness to the experiences in self-government of other constitutional orders. But at a different level, this paper develops Rawls' philosophy as part of the reconfiguration of claims once the concern with 'struggle for life' is squared with the 'struggle for recognition'. Recognition might not be the first question of politics, to borrow Bernard Williams's formula, but it is certainly an indispensable part of what political philosophy, and by extension constitutional law, must address in order to speak to our modern condition. For a philosophical history of the idea of recognition as the transformation of the active "to recognize" to the passive "to be recognized", see Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (Harvard, 2005) . heuristic appropriation of experiences in self-government of other peoples. Second, Rawls' later work offers a comprehensive and helpful philosophical structure for thinking about the question of liberal legitimacy in modern constitutional democracies. 28 Whatever reservations I have about some parts of that structure are beside the point of this paper -with one exception. Built-in Rawls' political liberalism is the idea of society as a closed system. He writes that "at some level there must exist a closed background system, and it is this subject for which we want a theory."
(PL, 272) I doubt it. Self-government, correctly understood, is about autonomy, not closedness. Specifically, the analysis draws on Political Liberalism to justify the openness to the experiences in self-government of other constitutional orders. But at a different level, this paper develops Rawls' philosophy as part of the reconfiguration of claims once the concern with 'struggle for life' is squared with the 'struggle for recognition'.
Recognition might not be the first question of politics, to borrow Bernard Williams's formula, but it is certainly an indispensable part of what political philosophy, and by extension constitutional law, must address in order to speak to our modern condition. For a philosophical history of the idea of recognition as the transformation of the active "to recognize" to the passive "to be recognized", see Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (Harvard, 2005 Note that these are ultimately questions about the terms of the interaction between citizens and public institutions. The continuing promise of self-government depends on the success of institutions to channel the exercise of political power fairly and effectively under conditions of pluralism without denying the equality and freedom of any of its members.
Pluralism has a pervasive impact on those channels. It widens the pool of perspectives on social and political life from which claims are drawn while at the same time deepening the need for justification of specific institutional responses in way acceptable to a pluralist citizenry. It makes justification more difficult to the extent that claims may target entrenched institutional practices whose legitimacy had been heretofore taken for granted. Pluralism also expands the social space that claims have to travel, heightening the risk that by the time a claim reaches its destination its representation of the claimant's original interests has become so distorted that the claimant can no longer assume ownership over the claim. To be sure, the construction of social space is not identical across societies. The perception of that space, like the social experience of pluralism itself, differs across societies in substance, form and intensity. For instance, the constellation of concerns surrounding linguistic diversity is unknown historically to linguistically homogeneous societies. Similarly, the struggle for racial justice, and its traces in the dimensions of constitutional equality, does not find historical anchor in racially homogeneous political communities. Such variations are not surprising given that comprehensive and political doctrines are clustered partly according to the historical starting point and social circumstances of a society's journey towards freedom and equality for all.
Only some forms of pluralism pose challenges to legitimacy. Many of our disagreements are shallow and can be resolved intersubjectively. Others are rooted in deep and irreconcilable comprehensive conceptions of the good that are unreasonable, or irrational. A conception of equality that condones the practice of slavery is one such example. Yet other disagreements are deep, irreconcilable and reasonable, such as our disputes over whether constitutional equality should be interpreted to protects citizens' interests in access to adequate education or shelter. The facticity of all forms of pluralism must be acknowledged. And while they all pose practical challenges to the stability of constitutional democracy, only reasonable pluralism poses theoretical challenges to the legitimacy of a constitutional system.
One effect of reasonable pluralism is the shift from an exclusive concern with justice to an emphasis on legitimacy. 34 Pluralism becomes internal to the question of justice when the existence of a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive conceptions of the good is taken as a given. Citizens of modern democracies disagree deeply and legitimately about what is just and fair. Since comprehensive conceptions cannot by definition be universalized to all members of a free community of equals -in the sense that not all members can be reasonably expected to endorse any given comprehensive conception -public institutions cannot condition citizens' access to their exercise of collective power on prior or subsequent endorsement of any particular comprehensive conception. Yet, the capacity of institutions to function remains indispensable to social ordering and stability. Since in a democracy "political power is ultimately the power of the public, that is, the power of the free and equal citizens as a collective body" 34 The distinction between judgments of validity, legitimacy and justice is discussed at length in Frank Michelman's work. See e.g., Frank Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 Modern L. Rev. 1("it can no more be assumed that that every valid law is legitimate than that every legitimate law is what it ought to be on the true and full moral and other practical merits", at 3); ("constitutional legitimation... offers a way of combining one's ethical impulse of allegiance owed to the decisions of procedurally fair majorities of fellow citizens with one's moral sense of there being limits on acceptable uses of the lawmaking and other coercive powers of the state.
Constitutional legitimation offers an apparent place of refuge from the tug-of-war between our loyalties to majorities and to justice", at 5).
(PL, 136), the question arises when can a collective political body coerce its members into compliance with rules whose fairness or wisdom they can reasonably contest, without denying their status as free and equal members of that political community. 35 What are the basic terms of the interaction between citizens and public institutions in pluralist societies? § 3. The demands of citizenship: personal and institutional
In a democracy, all citizens are and must act as reasonable sovereigns. Political space is normatively continuous and its continuity structures citizens' treatment of one another as well as how they treat, and are treated, by institutions -not surprisingly, since those institutions are theirs. Rawls traces this continuity to the shaping role of the basic structure of society: "citizens are to think of themselves and of one another in their political and social relationships as specified by the basic structure" (PL, at 300). 36 This continuity unveils the pervasive reach of the duty of civility that underlies the basis of institutional responsiveness as well as, conversely, the moral ills of non-responsiveness in any of its forms (wrong action, inaction, refusal to recognize or misrecognition). 37 Citizens are under a moral duty not to desist from dialogue until or unless objective constraints -of time, space, energy, resources or social cohesion -bring their conversation to an end. As with individuals, so with institutions. Under conditions of reasonable pluralism, institutions have a duty to secure and preserve high levels of responsiveness to citizens' claims for recognition and action, which includes a duty to establish mechanisms for limiting the distortion effects involved in the interpretation and processing of those claims. That duty demands constitutional mechanisms for self-correction through heuristic appropriation of the experiences of other constitutional democracies.
Let us start with the duty of citizens not to desist from dialogue, and begin by recalling the distinction in the previous section between shallow and irreducible disagreements. How can citizens tell them apart? Considering that only the latter type are intractable, it seems that an efficient allocation of time and energy would be to devote ourselves to the kinds of disagreements that can be overcome. Such an approach would not be risk-free. Just as toleration can lose its normative edge and become mere social etiquette, so awareness of the irreducibility of disagreement can act as a disincentive for sustained social engagement. Rawls avoids this risk by making the irreducibility of pluralism a theoretical feature. 38 Because citizens disagree about the nature of their disagreements as much as they disagree about substance, the distinction between shallow and intractable disagreements is irrelevant from a practical-political standpoint.
This becomes clear when we differentiate between two types of disputes.
The first type includes disputes where participants in dialogue are unburdened by energy or time constraints. In such cases, they must seek to solve their disagreements by way of persuasion. However unpleasant that effort might at times become, progress is sometimes possible since even disagreements that are ultimately irreducible may allow for relative convergence. 39 When, in that process of persuasion, the ethics of dialogue approaches a breaking point, as it will sooner or later, the specter of that looming breaking point will act as a constraint 38 "Political liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute depth of the irreconcilable latent conflict (between comprehensive doctrines)." (PL, xxviii) This form of latent disagreement stems from the nature of the issues we talk about, and is only reflected in how we talk about them. For a discussion about converge in the ethical and scientific realms, see Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 132 -155 (1985) .
39 Rawls writes about the narrowing of disagreements might constitute as basis for objectivity (PL, appropriate for achieving the goals they set for themselves, but also as reasonable -where reasonableness is the mark of their having internalized the existence of fellow human beings with whom, by no choice of their own, they share a political community and the world. Reciprocity is "the part of moral sensibility that connects with the idea of fair social cooperation" (PL, at 51) and a salient feature in the moral reasoning of citizens about political matters. If liberal constitutionalism comes as "a discovery of a new social possibility", then reasonableness -the fact that the existence of others is a factor in how we reason about ourselves -is no less a remarkable societal achievement. It forms the basis of social unity -and a relatively stable basis at that.
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The moral duty of civility captures in the language of obligation the signposts of citizens' reflection on the use of their political power in its myriad forms. That same duty shapes the moral reasoning of citizens over how they interact with one another as well as how they interact with institutions (and vice versa). Since "political power is ultimately the power of the public, that is, the power of the free and equal citizens as a collective body" (PL, 136), and, since political institutions exercise that political power, it follows that their interaction with citizens is implicitly the expression of how the public collectively interacts with one of its members.
Civility forms the moral basis of responsiveness -a dimension of legitimacy. In that context, reciprocity makes it so that citizens register not only instances of institutional unresponsiveness to their own demands, but to unresponsiveness to the demands of their fellow citizens -whose claims to the same institutions they cannot reasonably expect to deserve a lesser treatment than their own.
This point is especially important. The opportunity to press claims on institutions and thus to impact on their trajectories is crucial if citizens are to regard themselves "as self-42 This is true to the extent that it cannot be unlearned within the framework that enshrined it. The reason is that there is no route back from reflectiveness in terms of moral reciprocity, at least not within that framework. A
Bernard Williams writes about reflectiveness in general, it is not that "that nothing can lead to its reduction; both personally and socially, many things can. But there is no route back, no way in which we can consciously take In this section I argue that the legitimacy of a political order is partly a function of that order's responsiveness to citizens' claims for institutional recognition and/or action (or inaction).
Judgments of legitimacy are, in part, judgments about responsiveness of this kind. Rawls' work is relevant to our inquiry given the prominent role of the constitution in the conception of legitimacy. The legitimacy potential of a constitutional order increases to the degree that order has effective self-correcting mechanisms that preserve its responsiveness to the claims of individuals. Later sections will argue that openness to the experiences in self-government of other political communities is a self-correcting mechanism. the undistorted claims of citizens mean both for them and for the institutions before which they stand as claimants.
"Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy" (PL, 217). According to this principle, free and equal citizens can be coerced into obeying laws whose wisdom they may legitimately contest so long Since it is impossible to minimize the challenges of interpretation, let us instead attempt another answer to the problem of the impact of interpretation on the stabilizing social function of constitutional essentials. This answer will bring us closer to the common normative foundations of legitimacy and responsiveness. Recall that, since the constitutional essentials have a stabilizing social function, Rawls argues that they should not be easily changeable. However, should change ever be inevitable, the process by which change occurs must not be politicized, in the sense that it must not mirror shifts in the balance of political influence among comprehensive doctrines at a particular point in time (PL, ___). Rawls assumes here a kind of normative continuity between the original and subsequent formal processes of meaning-creation, which is when it was first formulated that the claimant might no longer be able to recognize it as her own.
When that happens, the claimant is bound to perceive the institutional answer as an answer not to her claim -and hence to conclude that the institution is unresponsive. It helps to develop a vocabulary to identify the origins and the destination of a constitutional claim. Specifically, I
introduce the concept of constitutional imaginary to refer to the origins of a constitutional claim to institutional action and/or recognition.
I adapt the concept of the constitutional imaginary from Charles Taylor shaping role on constitutional doctrine. Moreover, imaginaries are not confined within the formal ambit of their authors' particular political community. Citizens can reach out freely to how equality and freedom have been interpreted in other political communities. When the historical development of their own societies fails to recognize a dimension of a freedom and equality which they see as central to their standing as free and equals, they might be able to find that dimension articulated in other democratic polities. The experiences in self-government of other communities can expand a citizen's normative vocabulary by framing aspects of his own self that had found as yet no expression in his political order. For instance, claims of religious discrimination must overcome the burden of novelty in societies that are largely homogeneous from a religious standpoint; the same is not true in communities of thriving religious diversity.
Similarly, the dimensions of the constitutional right to property in Eastern European countries coming out of half a century of communist rule will be inevitably different from its meaning in older democracies.
While not identical, the spheres of citizens' constitutional imaginaries and constitutional law do not perfectly overlap but are or should be synchronized. Synchronization is a guarantee against citizens' political and social alienation. 62 The survival of certain elements of the constitutional imaginary might depend on his peers' endorsement through institutional action.
"What does not live in reality dies in the imagination", as one author put it. Let us start with distortion effects caused by the formalism of modern law. Translation into legal "code" is seldom without residue. The formal structure of legal categories into which claims are translated explains the loss of original nuance and complexity. For instance, when parties disagree whether nude dancing or movies exhibiting despicable cruelty towards animals are constitutionally protected "speech", it falls on courts to interpret the meaning of "speech"
and/or decide on the extent of its constitutional protection. Of course, citizens' claims do not reach courts as "raw" demands to institutional action or recognition for the satisfaction of why "the expectations of parties will often be disappointed by the results of a strictly professional legal logic": we have not moved to a post-nationalist age.").
88 It might look as if tying the authority of foreign law to its heuristic value recognizes normative weight to virtually anything that can have such heuristic value (novels! movies etc.). However! a closer look will show that the experience of other free communities of equals! as encapsulated in the outcomes of similarly positioned institutional actors! is different from philosophy books or movies. Decisions of constitutional democracies about dimensions of freedom or equality are committed to meeting the challenges of feasibility. In other words! moral insight about equality or freedom that emerges from the experience of self government testifies not only about ethical commitment but also about the hope for or proved reality of implementation. Of course the conditions of implementation differ across societies but the need for implementation shapes the process of reflection! which is where the heuristic value ultimately resides. For a recent example of this approach in judicial decisions! see McDonald v. Chicago! 561 U.S. ___ (2010) (Stevens! J.! dissenting) ( Admittedly! these other countries differ from ours in many relevant aspects But they are not so different from the United States that we ought to dismiss their experiences entirely While the American perspective' must always be our focus! it is silly indeed! arrogant to think we have nothing to learn about liberty from the billions of people beyond our borders." (slip op. 40 41).
values in ways unrelated to the claims of citizens or generally to the internal workings of the domestic constitutional system. 92 As a heuristic device, the use of foreign law becomes a mechanism for accessing dimensions of constitutional meaning that are central to claims brought by free and equal citizens, but which for whatever reasons the evolution of the constitutional system has concealed. 93 Recovering that concealed normative dimension is an indispensable element in how institutions meet their duty of responsiveness. The filter of the domestic legal system is thus never abandoned. The entire constitutional mechanism, and the relevance of foreign law as a mechanism for the correction of distortion effects, remains centered on the duty of domestic institutions to respond to the claims of their free and equal citizens.
One final point is necessary regarding the issue of convergence. I have argued that foreign law helps to recover unseen dimensions of constitutional meaning. But recovery does not mean that the new meanings automatically trump the more entrenched dimensions. The most that can be achieved by expanding the pool of normative references, in the way I have suggested, is to inject a degree of reflectiveness into the constitutional discourse at the specific request of citizens, or of other constitutional actors, including sua sponte the decision-makers themselves.
This does not guarantee specific outcomes, and endorsement of some dimensions of constitutional values is sometimes denied for good reason. For instance, the way that foreign courts, from Hungary to South Africa, have used American death penalty jurisprudence as an anti-model to be considered and rejected is a reminder that an assumption of convergence is not implied in the argument about the use of foreign law. 94 Foreign law is only a mechanism for the 92 If that case relied solely on arguments about constitutional values as they are enshrined in the constitutional text or interpreted by courts or other public institutions! it would in my view be a considerably weaker case. For instance! an argument that focused exclusively on the relation between a value (such as dignity) and a right (such as speech or equality) would be normatively deficient without is insufficient without the emphasis on the constitutional claim. For an illuminating discussion! see in Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in Michael J.
Meyer & William A. Parent, The Constitution of Rights 178 -191 (1992 
